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If you are arrested for Driving Under the Influence
in Wisconsin you will have to undergo a criminal proceeding for
the offense that you will have to deal with in a criminal court
setting. The blood alcohol content limit in Wisconsin is .08% that
means if you are pulled over for suspicion of DUI and you have a
BAC of .08% or higher than you will be considered legally drunk.
You can still be arrested for DUI in Wisconsin regardless of
whether or not you have submitted to a breath, blood, or urine
test. If you do take the chemical it may not matter whether
or not the results of the test reveal a blood alcohol content result of
.08% or higher. It is important to hire an experienced Wisconsin DUI
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negative outcome in your Wisconsin DUI case.
346.65
(1)Except as provided in sub. (5m), any person who violates s.346.62
(2)
(a) May be required to forfeit not less than $25 nor more than $200, except as provided in par. (b).
(b) May be fined not less than $50 nor more than $500 or imprisoned
for not more than one year in the county jail or both if the total of
convictions under s. 346.62 (2) or a local ordinance in conformity
therewith or a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or
band in this state in conformity with s. 346.62
(2) equals 2 or more in a 4-year period. The 4-year period shall be
measured from the dates of the violations which resulted in the
convictions.
(2) (am) Any person violating s. 346.63 (1):
1. Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more than $300, except as provided in subds. 2. to 5. and par. (f).
2. Except as provided in pars. (bm) and
(f), shall be fined not less than $350 nor more than $1,100 and
imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the
number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person's
lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other
convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) within a 10-year period,
equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising
out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.
3. Except as provided in pars. (cm), (f), and (g), shall be fined not
less than $600 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30
days nor more than one year in the county jail if the number of
convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person's lifetime,
plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other
convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 3, except that
suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same
incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.
4. Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), shall be fined not less
than $600 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 60 days
nor more than one year in the county jail if the number of convictions
under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the
total number of suspensions, revocations and other convictions counted
under s. 343.307 (1), equals 4, except that suspensions, revocations or
convictions arising out of the
same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.
5. Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), is guilty of a Class H
felony and shall be fined not less than $600 and imprisoned for not
less than 6 months if the number of convictions under ss.940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions,
revocations and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals
5 or more, except that suspensions, revocations or convictions arising
out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.(bm) In
Winnebago County, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions,
revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) within
a 10-year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or
convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be
counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (b) [par. (am)
2.], but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 days,
except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation
that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of
imprisonment shall be not less than 5 nor more than 7 days. A person
may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (cm) or sub. (2j)
(bm) or (cm) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime. NOTE: The correct
cross-reference is shown in brackets.
Corrective legislation is pending. (cm) In Winnebago County, if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1) within a 10-year period, equals 3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par. (c) [par. (am) 3.], but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 30 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 10 days.
A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par. (bm) or sub. (2j) (bm) or (cm) or (3r) once in his or her lifetime.
NOTE: The correct cross-reference is shown in brackets. Corrective legislation is pending. (f) If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (1), the applicable minimum and maximum forfeitures, fines, or imprisonment under par. (am) for the conviction are doubled. An offense under s. 346.63 (1) that subjects a person to a penalty under par. (am) 3., 4., or 5. when there is a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle is a felony and the place of imprisonment shall be determined under s. 973.02.
(g) 1. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.17 to 0.199, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par. (am) 3. to 5. are doubled. 2. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.20 to 0.249, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par. (am) 3. to 5. are tripled.
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while:(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and a controlled substance analog, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or (am) The person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.
(c) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b), the offenses shall be joined. If the person is found guilty of any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b) for Unofficial text from 03-04 Wis. Stats. database.
(d) In an action under par. (am) that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol. (2) (a) It is unlawful for any person to cause injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle while:
1. Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and a controlled substance analog, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
2. The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.
3. The person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.(am) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of any combination of par. (a) 1., 2., or 3. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating any combination of par. (a) 1., 2., or 3. in the complaint, the crimes shall bejoined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of any combination of par. (a) 1., 2., or 3. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under ss. 343.30 (1q) and 343.305. Paragraph (a) 1., 2., and 3. each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.
(b) 1. In an action under this subsection, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or a combination thereof, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, did not have a prohibited alcohol concentration described underpar. (a) 2., or did not have a detectable amount of a restricted con trolled substance in his or her blood.
2. In an action under par. (a) 3. that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors, gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol. (2m) If a person has not attained the legal drinking age, as defined in s. 125.02 (8m), the person may not drive or operate amotor vehicle while he or she has an alcohol concentration of more than 0.0 but not more than 0.08. One penalty for violation of this subsection is suspension of a person's operating privilege under s. 343.30 (1p). The person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10 at any time. If a person arrested for a violation of this subsection refuses to take a test under s. 343.305, the refusal is a separate violation and the person is subject to revocation of the person's operating privilege under s. 343.305 (10) (em).
(a) "Drive" means the exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion.
(b) "Operate" means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.
(4)If a person is convicted under sub. (1) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, or sub. (2), the court shall proceed under
s. 343.30 (1q).
(5) (a) No person may drive or operate a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.
(b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based on a violation of par. (a) or sub. (1)
(a) or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and sub. (1) (a),the offenses shall be joined. Paragraph (a) and sub. (1) (a) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require. If the person is found guilty of violating both par. (a) and sub. (1) (a) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. Each conviction shall be reported to the department and counted separately for purposes of suspension or revocation of the operator's license and disqualification.
(6) (a) No person may cause injury to another person by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.
(b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of par. (a) or sub.(2) (a) 1. or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and sub.(2) (a) 1. in the complaint, the crimes shall be joined under s.971.12. If the person is found guilty of violating both par. (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. Paragraph (a) and sub.(2) (a) 1. each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.
(c) Under par. (a), the person charged has a defense if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would have occurred even if he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or a combination thereof, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving or did not have an alcohol concentration described under par. (a).
(7) (a) No person may drive or operate or be on duty time with respect to a commercial motor vehicle under any of the following circumstances:
1. While having an alcohol concentration above 0.0.
2. Within 4 hours of having consumed or having been under the influence of an intoxicating beverage, regardless of its alcohol content.
3. While possessing an intoxicating beverage, regardless of its alcohol content. This subdivision does not apply to possession of an intoxicating beverage if the beverage is unopened and is manifested and transported as part of a shipment.
(b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon complaints based on a violation of this subsection and sub.(1) (a) or (b) or both, or sub. (1) (a) or (5) (a), or both, for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating this subsection and sub. (1) or (5), the proceedings shall be joined. If the person is found guilty of violating both this subsection and sub. (1) or (5) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions.
This subsection and subs. (1) and (5) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require. Each conviction shall be reported to the department and counted separately for purposes of suspension or revocation of the operator's license and disqualification.
It is no defense that the defendant is an alcoholic. State v. Koller, 60 Wis. 2d 755, 210 N.W.2d 770 (1973).
Evidence that the defendant, found asleep in parked car, had driven to the parking place 14 minutes earlier, was sufficient to support a conviction for operating a car while intoxicated. Monroe County v. Kruse, 76 Wis. 2d 126, 250 N.W.2d 375 (1977).
Intent to drive or move a motor vehicle is not required to find an accused guilty of operating the vehicle while under influence of intoxicant. Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980).
The court properly instructed the jury that it could infer from a subsequent breathalyzer reading of .13% that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the stop. Alcohol absorption is discussed. State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981).
A previous conviction for operating while intoxicated is a penalty enhancer, not an element of the crime. State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982). But as to operating with a prohibited blood alcohol count, see the note to State v. Ludeking, 195 Wis. 2d 132, 536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-1527.
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show the physical manifestation of the defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 Wis. 2d 381, 328 N.W.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
Sub. (1) (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Muehlenberg, 118 Wis. 2d 502, 347 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1984).
The trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence a blood alcohol chart produced by the department of transportation showing the amount of alcohol burned up over time. State v. Hinz, 121 Wis. 2d 282, 360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984).
The definitions of ªunder the influenceº in this section and in s. 939.22 are equivalent. State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).
Sub. (1) (b) establishes a per se rule that it is a violation to operate a motor vehicle with a specified breath alcohol content, regardless of the individual's partition ratio. The provision is constitutional. State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). First offender OVWI prosecution is a civil offense, and jeopardy does not attach to prevent a subsequent criminal prosecution. State v. Lawton, 167 Wis. 2d 461, 482 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1992). Because there is no privilege under s. 904.05 (4) (f) for chemical tests for intoxication, results of a test taken for diagnostic purposes are admissible in an OMVWI trial without patient approval. City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 536, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992). Dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw when it is drawn incident to a lawful arrest and there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be found. State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993).
When a municipal court found the defendant guilty of OWI and dismissed a blood alcohol count charge without finding guilt, the defendant's appeal of the OWI conviction under s. 800.14 (1) did not give the circuit court jurisdiction to here the BAC charge absent an appeal of the dismissal. Town of Menasha v. Bastian, 178 Wis. 2d 191, 503 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1993).
Prior convictions are an element of sub. (1) (b) and evidence of the convictions is required regardless of potential prejudice. State v. Ludeking, 195 Wis. 2d 132, 536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-1527.
Failure to timely notify a person of the right to an alternative blood alcohol test does not affect the presumption of the validity of a properly given blood test and is not grounds for suppressing the test results. County of Dane v. Granum, 203 Wis. 2d 252, 551 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-3470.
A request to perform field sobriety tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. County of Dane v. Campshure, 204 Wis. 2d 27, 552 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0474.
Immobility of a vehicle does not preclude a finding that the vehicle was being operated. Movement is not necessary for operation. State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0241.
Criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content subsequent to administrative suspension of a driver's operating privileges does not constitute multiple punishment and double jeopardy. State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 30, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996), 95-1159.
Evidence of a refusal that follows an inadequate warning under s. 343.305 (4) violates due process, but admission is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Schirmang, 210 Wis. 2d 324, 565 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2008.
A defendant's refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is not protected by the right against self-incrimination and is admissible as evidence. State v. Mallick, 210 Wis. 2d 427, 565 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-3048.
While prior convictions are an element of a violation of sub. (1) (b), admitting evidence of that element may not be proper. Admitting any evidence of prior convictions and submitting the element of the defendant's status as a prior offender to the jury when the defendant admitted to the element was an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Alexander, 214 Wis.2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997), 96-1973.
Prosecution under both sub. (1) (a) and (b) does not violate double jeopardy because there can only be one conviction and one punishment. Dual prosecution also does not violate due process. State v. Raddeman, 2000 WI App 190, 238 Wis. 2d 628, 618 N.W.2d 258, 00-0143.
A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240,99-1765. A department of transportation driving record abstract presented at a preliminary examination to show prior convictions was sufficient to establish probable cause of prior offenses. State v. Lindholm, 2000 WI App 225, 239 Wis. 2d 167, 619 N.W.2d 267, 99-2298.
Sub. (1), operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol count, is not a lesser included offense of sub. (2) (a), injury-related operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol count. State v. Smits, 2001 WI App 45, 241 Wis. 2d 374, 626 N.W.2d 42, 00-1158.
That a person agreed to a breath test, but not a blood test, did not render police insistence on a blood test unreasonable. State v. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, 247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 N.W.2d 867, 00-3419.
By consenting to the taking of a blood sample, the defendant also consented to the chemical analysis of the sample. Those are not separate events for warrant requirement purposes. State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411, 01-0222.
Probation is permitted under s. 973.09 (1) (d) for 4th and subsequent OWI violations, as long as the probation requires confinement for at least the mandatory minimum time period under this section. State v. Eckola, 2001 WI App 295, 249 Wis. 2d 276, 638 N.W.2d 903, 01-1044.
A warrantless nonconsensual blood draw from a person arrested with probable cause for drunk driving is constitutional under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th amendment, even if the person offers to submit to a chemical test other than the blood test chosen by law enforcement, provided that the blood draw complies with the factors enumerated in Bohling. State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385, 99-3165.
The analysis of blood taken in a warrantless nonconsensual draw, constitutional under Krajewski, is the examination of evidence obtained pursuant to a valid search and not a second search requiring a warrant. State v. Riedel, 2003 WI App 18, 259 Wis. 2d 921, 656 N.W.2d 789, 02-1772.
Evidence from a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw is admissible when: 1) the blood is drawn to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related violation; 2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication; 3) the method used to take the blood sample is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw. In the absence of an arrest, probable cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk-driving-related violation satisfies the first and second prong. State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407, 01-3367.
A DOT certified driving transcript was admissible evidence that established the defendant's repeater status as an element of the PAC offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Van Riper, 2003 WI App 237, 267 Wis. 2d 759, 672 N.W.2d 156, 03-0385.
The rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream of an individual arrested for drunk driving is an exigency that justifies the warrantless nonconsensual test of the individual's blood, so long as the test satisfies the 4 factors enumerated in Bohling. A presumptively valid chemical sample of the defendant's breath does not extinguish the exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw. The nature of the evidence sought, (the rapid dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream) not the existence of other evidence, determines the exigency. State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371, 03-0952.
Field sobriety tests are not scientific tests but are observational tools that law enforcement officers commonly use to assist them in discerning various indicia of intoxication, the perception of which is necessarily subjective. The procedures an officer employs in determining probable cause for intoxication go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. City of West Bend v. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36, 278 Wis. 2d 643, 693 N.W.2d 324, 04-1871.
The per se ban on driving or operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in one's blood under sub. (1) (am) bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the goal of regulating the safety of roadways and is not fundamentally unfair such that there is a due process violation, nor does the statute offend principles of equal protection. State v. Smet, 2005 WI App 263, 288 Wis. 2d 525, 709 N.W.2d 474, 05-0690.
A defendant was not operating a vehicle under this section by merely sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle, although the engine was running, when the uncontested evidence showed that the defendant was not the person who left the engine running, had never physically manipulated or activated the controls necessary to put the vehicle in motion, and there was no circumstantial evidence that the defendant recently operated the vehicle, while another person had operated the vehicle. Village of Cross Plains v. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, 288 Wis. 2d 551, 709 N.W.2d 447, 04-2232.
First offense violations of sub. (1) (a) are assimilated under federal Assimilative Crimes Act when committed on federal enclave. U.S. v. Manning, 700 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
(1)The laws relating to operating a motor vehicle and drinking alcohol, using controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, or using any combination of alcohol, controlled substances and controlled substance analogs.
(2)The effects of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, or the use of them in any combination, on a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle.
History: 1981 c. 20; 1995 a. 448.
(1) No person who owns or has direct control of a commercial motor vehicle or any vehicle operated upon a highway for the conveyance of passengers for hire shall employ as an operator of such vehicle and retain in the person's employment any person who is addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor or to the use of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under ch. 961. In addition to being subject to fine or imprisonment as prescribed by law, such person shall forfeit $5 for each day such operator is retained in the person's employ.
(2)Upon conviction of an operator of a commercial motor vehicle or any vehicle operated for the conveyance of passengers for hire, for driving or operating such vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, the owner or person having direct control of such vehicle shall discharge such operator from such employment. No person shall employ or retain in employment as an operator of a commercial motor vehicle or a vehicle operated upon a highway for the conveyance of passengers for hire any person who has been so convicted within the preceding 6-month period or any person during a period of disqualification under s. 343.315, unless s. 343.055 (2) applies. In addition to being subject to fine or imprisonment as prescribed by law, such person shall forfeit $5 for each day such operator is retained in the person's employ contrary to the provisions of this subsection.
History: 1971 c. 219; 1989 a. 105, 359; 1995 a. 448.
